Pages

Thursday, October 24, 2013

The Transformation of the Concept into the Dialectical Image

This should probably contain a section at the end on the inadequacy of the image as against the Concept, because it's not a one-to-one translation by any means. I think both are useful in different contexts. Anyway, this is a paper I wrote for a comp lit class.

The Transformation of the Concept into the Dialectical Image

I. Introduction

Time is an important concept for all those who would claim descent, positively or negatively, from Hegel's dialectical philosophy. In the first place, dialectical thought is that which moves by way of the dissolution of the fixed rigidity of conceptual thought, already in fact implying a temporal character of some kind. In the second place, dialectical thought is immanently historical by the extension of this change to encompass the totality conceived of as social. The problem arises when one attempts to explicate the exact nature of this temporal and historical character: according to Kojève's interpretation of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, this temporal character of the Concept (the axial dialectical category) is that it is time itself, which therefore is always historical time; for Benjamin, time as time (and therefore as history) cannot be the whole story (so to speak) of time, and thus it is transposed onto space. The major consequences of this spatialization will be seen to be a radical mediation of the immediate and mediation, and a dissolution of the remnants of reification in Hegel's system, of which Reason's march in universal history is the greatest. So these two interpretations of the importance of time—time as time and time as space—overdetermine the concept of history, the former resulting in undialectical Reason and the latter in a dialectical dissolution of Reason itself. The exposition of the dialectical image will be a conceptual one, showing in fact the superiority of the image by the Concept's own immanent demands.

II. Hegel: The Negativity of Time as Time

To understand Hegel's fixation on the negativity of time, we must first relate it to the Concept (Begriff). In his own words, “Die Zeit ist der daseiende Begriff selbst”, and “Die Zeit ist der Begriff selbst, der da ist” (qtd. in Kojève 101). In other words, time is the empirically existing Concept itself, that Concept which is there. In interpreting these phrases, we must keep in mind Hegel's view of negativity as that which is the negation of the given, which negation is none other than the Concept, that immanent anti-given movement of the object. As Kojève summarizes, “The conceptual understanding of empirical reality is equivalent to a murder” (140). The Concept of something is nothing but the always-occurring nihilation of that very something, the constantly-changing negation of that something, whether one believes that change comes from subject or object, or as Hegel believed, from both at once. Time as time for Hegel is Concept, because the subject-object divide of reality which creates movement in the proper sense only comes with the appearance of the Concept on the historical scene, with the advent of human (self-)consciousness. Therefore, Hegel's notion of time is applicable only to historical time—strictly speaking, nature has no time, though this does not discount the possibility of some kind of change. As nature does not have an inner telos, Hegel (according to Kojève) will say that it is not time but space.

The first important consequence of the manifold equivocation of time, Concept, and history is that Hegel's is ultimately a social philosophy. Ignoring for the moment his botched attempt at a philosophy of nature, Hegel proclaims the fundamentally historical nature of all thought and of all human being—indeed, the two are posited to be identical (if only in their immanent movement and not in their present givenness). Further, there can be no society without history—the past of a given social moment distinguishes the possible future in the present from dream or utopia. However, the relation of the temporal modalities of past, present, and future is not in Hegel a simple progression of past to present and then on to future. Rather, Hegelian Time is a movement from future through past to present. In other words, the “Project”, the Concept with a focus on the future, is determined by the historical past, and then becomes the moment of negation of the given in the present. Or again, Desire is Desire to negate the given real, which in that negation becomes past; this manner of past being formed through future (Desire/Concept) is what determines the present. Taken in this way, the temporal modalities cannot really be separated, but the moments are yet analyzable, the present turning upon the tension between future as desire to negate the given and past as that negated no-longer-given.

Time must be in space, and indeed the two mutually presuppose each other in good dialectical fashion. However, for Hegel, time is the primary contradiction, being that which is, however abstractly, opposed to the inert space of nature. Due to the necessary historical nature of time, that time must occur in a historical world, in other words, in space. However, the tension between the two is obvious—the moments of time are not for Hegel transposed onto a spatial world, because of the association of time with history and space with nature. Only insofar as nature exists in relation to social humanity and its history can the sub-categories of time be applied to it. Verstand is the name given to that spatial thinking that is philosophically inferior to Vernunft, one of whose primary categories is the Idea, the utter interiorization of Concepts (this interiorization being the very definition of Kantian or Bergsonian time) which, no matter how contradictory, are always already under the aspect of identity. Space, which is defined primarily by its exteriority, obviously cannot fill this gap (so to speak).

III. Benjamin: The Negativity of Time as Space

Benjamin's project can in some ways be seen as an internalization of what were in Hegel only externally related, namely time and space. Benjamin's preference for space over time is well-noted, as when he positively states, “The task of epic theater, according to Brecht, is not so much the development of actions as the representation of conditions” (150). Here the development of actions corresponds to Geschichte, (narrative) time, whereas representation seems to signify a spatial construction. Geschichte is disparaged, along with all perceived teleologies, as bourgeois ideology. Therefore, rather than deal with time as Geschichte, Benjamin transposes temporal characteristics onto space itself. The dialectical image is the result: it emerges out of the past, but its form and features can only be seen or understood in the non-narrative present, out of its temporal context. Here, though, we learn only about this present from it, not about the past. As an image it is spatial, and as dialectical it is philosophical, the spatialization of the Concept-as-time that was so important for Hegel. However, the transition, the translation from time to space is one whose character is yet to be established.

The obvious change is that from narrative to non-narrative, and this is the ostensible reason for the translation, but yet another consequence is the retention of a certain temporality. Benjamin holds onto notions of past and present and future, moments that are made both intimately internal to one another and at the same time absolutely external. For example, in describing the storyteller, what we may rightly take as a dialectical image, Benjamin writes, “Viewed from a certain distance, the great, simple outlines which define the storyteller stand out in him, or rather, they become visible in him, just as in a rock a human head or an animal's body may appear to an observer at the proper distance and angle of vision” (83). This distance Benjamin speaks of is a temporal distance, although not only that. Internally-related, the dialectical image contains it's own pastness as an element, related, to be sure, to its future, which is now the present. The present is where the knowledge is gained, where action can take place, where mediation meets immediacy as Hegel proclaimed was necessary. On the other hand, these concepts of past, present, and future are external to space and to each other, in the sense that their relations are dissected and their organs exposed. The death of the narrative is thus assured in this spatial constellation, wherein the immediacy of the present is privileged against the mediation of time. To remain historical, the dialectical image is temporal, but it is certainly not time itself, as is Hegel's Concept.

There remain two questions relating to the dialectical image, that of its immediacy and that of its critical negativity. The immediacy of the dialectical image is, on the surface, problematic. As an image out of context it is obviously not mediated in the same overt fashion as the Hegelian Concept. Context, according to Benjamin, destroys the dissimilarity of the object at hand: “[Proust] lay on his bed racked with homesickness, homesick for the world distorted in the state of resemblance” (205, italics mine). The similarity of things or processes to one another, be it a phenomenal similarity or, perhaps more importantly, a contextual similarity, is false. So we have a theory in which mediation, under the aspect of identity, is distorting and false. But this identity is only a partial one, remaining focused on the mediation of time. Indeed, systemic mediation may avoid the entire problem for Benjamin, in that the constellation of bourgeois society remains for him an important reference point. Following Hegel's dictum that there can be no immediacy without mediation and vice versa, Benjamin takes it upon himself to extract the true kernel of mediation from its time-bound shell. This results, not surprisingly, in the messy mediation of the present, that spatial relation in which the lack of time-context is at the same time the placing of the image into what may be interpreted as its true context. Again, Benjamin is utterly historical though he repudiates history as such, though he opposes immediate context qua context. The immediacy of the dialectical image thus becomes its true mediation. Corresponding to the fragmentation of society, the utter falsity of the bourgeois ideology of progress, Benjamin's fragmented spatial dialectics are wholly justified. From this its critical negativity follows, insofar as the new “immediacy” is in some sense the truth of the old, if only (and it assuredly is) negatively.

IV. Conclusion: The Ideology of Progress and Critical Temporality

The following remark by Kojève appears as the antithesis of Benjamin's understanding of both dialectic and time: “It is by historical memory that Man's identity preserves itself throughout History, in spite of the auto-negations which are accomplished in it, so that he can realize himself by means of History as the integration of his contradictory past or as totality, as dialectical entity” (232, italics Kojève's). It would not be off the mark to level the charge of bourgeois ideology against Kojève, left-Hegelian though he may be. However, the temptation to do away with him on this account must be resisted, and in the name of Hegelian thought itself.

Benjamin writes, “Historicism gives the 'eternal' image of the past; historical materialism supplies a unique experience with the past” (262). A better example of historicism could not be found than Hegel himself, in whose philosophy history receives its proper ordering only after the fact, and in which strictly phenomenological knowledge of history and consciousness only emerge in the post-historical world (Kojève 183-4). Hegel's eternal past is one that cannot adequately develop even into an image thereof, not because of the negating-negativity of the Concept, but because of Hegel's hypostasis of History predicated on the undialectical nature of his notion of Reason. Indeed, there is nothing in the character of the dialectic itself that would proscribe the type of transformation that Benjamin has wrought from time to space, as long as that space is properly historicized.

But to what extent is Benjamin's dialectical image capable of the destruction of ideology, particularly that of bourgeois progress? Benjamin writes, “The concept of the historical progress of mankind cannot be sundered from the concept of its progression through a homogeneous, empty time” (261). Dialectically, things change not by continuous progress, but by violent break—concepts don't approach their opposites slowly and thereafter “run together” until they are unrecognizable; rather, they crash into each other as mighty waves, as the furious demolition of a storefront via molotov cocktail. An obvious “artistic” parallel is the montage, the spatial decontextualization-as-proper-contextualization. This spatial time thereby pointed to is one absolutely antithetical to the Hegelian philosophy of history, which viciously betrays the very character of dialectical thought itself. Only such a gradualist model could declare the “end of history”, or the related claim of the reformists that the groundwork has already been laid, and that all that is left to do is wait for utopia. Hegel claimed not more than this!

Finally, in the spirit of remaining political, we may say a few concluding words about the importance of a spatialization that is both historical and preservative of critical negativity. First, as historical, the dialectical image retains the social mediation of the Hegelian Concept and the Marxian insistence on economic and social practice. Second, as critically negative, the dialectical image leaves behind the problematic Hegelian and vulgar Marxist teleology which would subordinate the particular to the already-assumed individual as universally-mediated particular, which is nothing other than the system of capitalist oppression itself, in all its bloody self-denial.

Works Cited

Benjamin, Walter. Illuminations. Trans. Harry Zohn. Ed. Hannah Arendt. New York: Schocken Books, 2007. Print.

Kojève, Alexandre. Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit. Ed. Allan Bloom. Trans. James H. Nichols. New York: Basic Books, 1969. Print.

All material copyright Nick Beard (except the cited sources).

Tuesday, October 22, 2013

Aphorisms II: Immanent Critique and Peculiarity Production

1. Theory for theory's sake, when critical, is nothing but the faith that theory will, if only in the end, emerge, as in a dialectical unfolding, for its other, that is, for political practice.

2. The totality is the infinity of determinate negation, which infinity is the expressive self-containment of the finite--in its own expressive curtailment it penetrates the truth of its own inner void.

3. A concept is immanent to the extent that it is objectively there. This translation is one that typically cannot avoid creating a metalanguage between object and concept, and therefore a metalanguage on thin air--but air is needed to breathe.

4. The self-abstraction of the capitalist system is the hidden truth of bourgeois masochistic wish-fulfillment: to confront the reality of market functioning is enough to invite claims of exception, thereby proving the rule, that reality is indeed a Freudian dream.

5. The immanent critique of capitalist society needs no conscious material on which to work; rather, it is enough that a self-understanding be allowed to emerge from the social unconscious. The concepts contained therein--and surely they are there--are already universals, carrying out their abstractions under the cover of apathy. This is where practice enters the picture.

6. Not particularity, but peculiarity is the mark of the potential for liberation today. The tragedy is that nostalgia has usurped that apparatus which is the infinite machine of peculiarity production, the dream-logic of the inattentive mind. This is capitalism's well-known basis in the ideology of nostalgic progress.

Sunday, September 29, 2013

To The Things Not-in-Themselves!



Positivity is bad faith--this could be the slogan of our times, the latter designation applying to the post-WWII world. Everything turns upon this negation.

The positive as that which is itself in itself, or rather even for itself, cannot be but is. We cannot help doubting the utter inconceivability of something complete, even as we strive for it in all branches of thought, positive or negative as they may be. This is the great paradox, that thought as universal becomes its dialectical opposite, that negation of which the determinateness of all being is constituted. Positivity being bad faith, where does that leave negativity? One cannot be utterly negative, try as Adorno did. The time for that striving for completeness in incompleteness has come and gone. But this criticism is not just one blindly putting forth the positivity in all things due to their givenness--this Hegel destroyed in the very first deduction of the Phenomenology of Spirit. Rather, what we are left with is the quality of positivity as concreteness. It is the only positivity that still makes sense. But how exactly is it positive?

The concrete is "positive", in that the particularity of the given is constituted by determinate negation. Not that the negation of the negation is positive, but that, on a surface-level, objects are constituted concretely by determinate negation. There is no longer the question, as there was for Hegel, as to whether essence appears and is that very appearance. Rather, our question is different, given our immediate discounting of the question of essence. We ask whether the surface phenomena do not themselves preclude the possibility of themselves, not just of their essences, having a really determinate existence. In other words, we no longer believe in the whole, whether a Concept/Notion (Begriff) or the totality itself, and rightly so. We need a new relation to the whole and especially the totality, a negative and contradictory one. It cannot be such that it is a self-positing subject, as it was for Hegel. Rather it will be a self-negating, truly dialectical totality. It is thus a dialectic that will never cease--the prospect is scary. As Marcuse said: Reason is the truly undialectical element of Hegel's philosophy (paraphrased from Reason and Revolution).

So how to synthesize this with my previous thoughts on the totality relating to the theory of mysticism? Inevitably it has something to do with the nature of determinate negation and its relation to non-duality, and that would work it in nicely with revolutionary politics. So, onward! To the things not-in-themselves!


Wednesday, September 25, 2013

The Saturated Character of Despair

I was thinking today about the problems or ideas that just seize a group/generation/class and lead them onward into uncharted territory. Typically these are present in the history of philosophy as insoluble aporias which must be neutralized by a shifting of philosophical perspective. New concepts must be developed, and new ways of thinking employed. For Hegel's generation the aporia was that between radical Kantian freedom and the embodied expressivist theory of the subject (see Taylor's "Hegel"). For Marx and the Young Hegelians it was rather the refutation by political and social reality of Hegel's Geist, which was disguised by the latter as the "cunning of reason". But what is this problem now, for us? Do we have an animating idea for our age?

It appears we are still stuck in the radical negativity of the Frankfurt School, as far as intellectual consciousness is concerned. Sure, Zizek and Badiou and whoever else have dazzling new philosophies, but I think they have not yet penetrated the age's consciousness. Perhaps in time they will. But for now it still remains: Where do we go from here? Where does thought (and with it radical politics) go? Where can it go, based on the political, social, and economic "parameters"?

I suppose it would be pertinent to ask: Where do I want it to go? What a question! As interested as I am in philosophy, I don't really know. Perhaps in this sense I am a good example of what I think our aporia is. We are directionless. This lack of direction manifests itself not just as an empty field, wherein one could go wherever one so pleases, but as a radical reification, as a chaining to directionlessness itself. If one wants to go somewhere else, one is "a dreamer! An idealist! You can't just change things--it's irresponsible!"

To use Badiou's concept, I think that the current discourse is "saturated". Something must "happen". But how to make that happening a determinate negation? It must begin here, and nowhere else. We live in an age of ideological contradiction, and a major one of these is that between the naive liberal optimism of consciousness and the profound subjectivist pessimism of the sub-/unconscious. The problem is this, that when that deeper level is broken into, when the most egregious theses of bourgeois ideology are abandoned (insofar as these can be), what is there to do but feel despair?

Sunday, September 8, 2013

The Night in Which All Absolutes are Abstract

The comparison of Brahman with the noumenal is one that is quite easy to make, and one that I have made numerous times in the past. Brahman is like the Ding-an-sich, but non-formal. It is not a precondition for our understanding, but rather an object of experience (as a model?). Brahman can be found, seen, and experienced as the non-phenomenal. A kind of experience of non-experience that is only such because of the initial sundering. It is a concretized process, one of initial unity followed by separation and then the inevitable reconciliation. But this answering in regards to the process still does not adequately answer Hegel's critique of Schelling's Absolute (which applies to Kant's Ding-an-sich of course, being a more formal version of Schelling).

Schelling's Absolute, "the night in which all cows are black" (says Hegel), was one in which  opposition could not be found. It was the naive unity which could not help but differentiate itself and thus undermine itself. This differentiation of the concept is shown to be necessary by Hegel (as in the Greater Logic). However, what if Brahman was not a concept such as Schelling's Absolute, not a non-differentiated and thus empty idea, but a concrete unity, that is, a concept in which both separation (Trennung) and identity are to be found? The explicit working-out of the concept of Brahman ought to be different from the Hegelian Logic due to the non-practical nature of that Logic (while formally the Absolute Idea is not transcendent, I have a certain suspicion that unless one integrates experience and conceptuality explicitly and practically, and not just a formal equation of the two, then one cannot really have overcome the difference; this is where Hindu philosophy comes in handy).

Hegel remarks that "indeterminateness and emptiness of representation" is "altogether the same as what an Indian calls Brahma, when for years on end, looking only at the tip of his nose, externally motionless and equally unmoved in sensation, representation, phantasy, desire, and so on, he inwardly says only Om, Om, Om, or else nothing at all. This dull, empty consciousness, taken as consciousness, is just this - being" (Hegel, The Science of Logic, Cambridge 2010 edition, p. 73).

Perhaps it is supererogatory to state that Hegel (and pretty much all Europeans of the day) has no idea what he is talking about. I aim to find exactly why this is true, philosophically at that.


Tuesday, September 3, 2013

The Maybe-Heaven

Actuality, the Actual Totality, is a meaningless mechanistic conglomeration of cold, dead matter--the dregs cast out from the realm of the Virtual as being unfit to serve; Actuality is what is too bad to be even concrete possibility. The contradictions of past as against future, and of future as against past (this being distinct from the first), assure the present as the greatest contradiction of all, against whatever good reckoning might be brought to bear on the problem. In other words, the actuality of the present is pulled both ways by bullshit (the bullshit of freedom, or is it the freedom of bullshit?).

This is not to say that the Virtual Totality is a heaven. Virtual (symbolic) commitments are eternal, but only so long as we allow them to be. Unfortunately, that freedom only emerges from the self-determined (read: non-determined!). Thus, the Virtual Totality may be meaningful, it may make sense, but, being Virtual, it is anyone's guess whether this is the case. The fact that Actuality is fundamentally shitty (maybe primarily in its relation to the Virtual?) doesn't help one's spirits either. Notice the lack of referent--who's it shitty for? That question is one of the shittiest.

So here we have the closed loop of freedom once again, a loop which is not so much self-determined (as would be a real freedom) as it is determined by planar differences (these being Virtual or Actual as the case may be). A diremption necessary for time, but then again badness is eternally temporal. Reminds me of Benjamin--maybe doubt is truth, in its aspect as the Infinite, that self-determined parts-and-whole which was only so recently the Ought. I believe we are trapped in this Ought, though the dialectic may go on unabated, unheeding.

Thursday, August 8, 2013

I Am Not a Mystic

Let me say right here that I AM NOT A MYSTIC. I don't have firsthand experience of Brahman (yet). I am not a master of meditation. I am only a philosopher (at least I like to think so) attempting to understand different states of consciousness, and applying rationality to the insights gained in what little meditation I have done. There are a few reasons as to why I think this is a legitimate thing to do:

1. Direct experience does NOT translate into correct rationalization, though it may help it along. Many of the arguments and rationalizations of mysticism and non-duality, etc. are unconvincing or missing important aspects or unable to be squared with dialectical Marxism, which I hold at this point as the basis of truth/reality (in other words, I know it works, in whatever non-utiliatarian way I might possibly mean by that).

2. There are certain intellectual aporias that characterize different ages of thought, and I believe ours to be the subjective/objective or identity/difference or whatever name you want to ascribe to the duality. It must be transcended, and this must be done on its own terms, a historical continuity. The question of our historical period must be answered. It must be sublated. This is obviously very difficult and I doubt I can do it, but why not try?

3. I like mysticism and I like Marxism, so that's a pretty good justification, right?