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Showing posts with label dialectics. Show all posts
Showing posts with label dialectics. Show all posts

Monday, April 28, 2014

Nancy's Hegel: Touching the Negative

Wow, I wrote this last semester and already there is so much I would change. First of all, I don't think I've understood Nancy very well at all, but rather have interpreted him as just another take on dialectics, which he most decidedly is not. So I apologize, but I think the paper is still worth uploading, even if only for personal reasons.
Nancy's Hegel: Touching the Negative
Negativity is that which moves of itself, annihilating every given through its irresistible logic, and at the same time the dissolution thereof. Nowhere is the brute fact safe from the power of non-identity, the power of the “think again!” and of the “be again!”. There is nothing in Heaven or on Earth that is not utterly mediated, hence negative. The following essay is based on the two thinkers GWF Hegel and Jean-Luc Nancy. The latter's book Hegel: The Restlessness of the Negative contains a loose rereading of both Hegel's major works, The Phenomenology of Spirit and Science of Logic (among other works Nancy includes in the appendices). It is perhaps not too great a claim to make that Hegel's immense labor of the negative is the most influential take on negativity and mediation in the philosophical world. With Hegelian negativity as its starting point, Nancy's thought in Hegel proceeds to reconceptualize many of Hegel's most important claims, primarily about the totality, thought and Spirit, the master-slave dialectic, and the ever-present and all-important negativity.
Such negativity, such mediation, however, can be taken to signify myriad things, and the specific object or function of negativity and negation is not always clear. Indeed, the concept of the negative must be explored in relation to our shared horizon of meaning—negativity given or posited as merely in itself can have startling and confusing results for theory given the dominant logic of identification. This, however, is not a problem for Nancy, for whom the loss of the whole, called the “end of the world” in The Sense of the World, is felt acutely. This is not to say that the negative act or the negative originary pre-symbolic being-affected, such as the trembling of the slave in the presence of the true master that is death, is unimportant—far from it. Rather, the concept must give way before the act of its own accord, or else we have nothing.
It is only with this in mind that we can do philosophy as it relates to the negative and therefore as it relates to truly critical theory; both “critical” and “theory” have as their preconditions the transcendence of metaphysics and of uncritical philosophy effected on their very borders, at the limits of discourse. There can be, we must insist, no new foundational gestures, which would of course only result in yet another object of critique. While causing difficulties of presentation and writing, this seems to me to be the only truly effective strategy today; pretending oneself out of aporias will get us nowhere. As Theodor Adorno wrote, “Unity alone can transcend unity” (Negative Dialectics 158). In other words, transcendence of the concept can only truly be effected by and through the concept. We may abstract from Adorno's language and come to the conclusion that, convoluted as it may be, discourse alone can transcend discourse, and discourse is necessarily within the despotic realm of the symbolic. However, that discourse can hold a non-signifying function, it can make the motion of transcending the symbolic, and this precarious limit-space is exactly where Nancy will locate the majority of his thought. Whereas Adorno wrote above of the concept, we must here turn our attention to the given more generally. The transition must occur due to the nature of our undertaking, wherein we are dealing with negativity as ontological non-identity, not simply non-identity as what overflows the given symbolic system, as the particularity that cannot wholly be absorbed and this thus defined against that symbolic system. The given is, taken by itself, problematic in its inability to provide for the ground that is in each case the precondition of the given. Following Hegel in the opening sections of The Phenomenology of Spirit, we can say that given immediacy cannot be the whole picture. In other words—and this will become clear—the given cannot give that by which it is given; this latter thing is fundamentally ungiveable. Thus, Hegel's thought is “what happens to thought in itself and for itself as soon as sense are truth are not presented to it as given” (Nancy 30). This givenness is not given for both logical and historical reasons, the former as presented by Hegel and the latter as developed by Nancy, not that Nancy ignores the former of course.
The reason for this primary focus on subverting identification, which I believe to be very important, is twofold: identification and a denial of difference or particularity is the dominant logic of the capitalist system; and the search for a ground always runs the risk of finding that ground. With regard to the first, the abstract identification of diverse labors, the law of value, while ontologically requiring the diversity of those labors to begin with, is the objective state of affairs of the world as it stands today. This state of affairs is not only one that exists—rather, it is one that perpetuates itself as real illusion.
To think that identification, and to think beyond and through that identification into non-identity—to think an immanent critique in other words, while still recognizing, through our analysis, our own socially necessary complicity in evil—is the goal. Second, the search for a ground is not a meaningless or senseless one. Far from it, the search for ground is carried out not only by the human subject, but effectively by all reality. However, it will soon become apparent that the search for a ground, the striving for singularity, cannot truly be achieved. Instead, we are often left with the appearance of having succeeded, and it will be seen that this is the most dangerous thing of all, despite the actual impossibility of such a success, despite the always already plural, differentiated, and particular character of being and beings.
In the following section, I will provide a brief discussion of Hegel's master-slave dialectic, and then proceed to an explication of the radical theory of the self put forth by Nancy, which will be seen as basing itself on a problematization of the stable categories of self and other found in Hegel. In section III, the problem of thought and manifestation will be examined, especially specifically as it relates to what I will call the appearance of essence and appearance. In section four, the question of immanence and transcendence will be broached, and we will see that Nancy dodges the dichotomy in important ways, e.g. through his thought of infinity. Finally, in section V, I will examine the objective reality of identification and the possibilities for the critique thereof.
II. The Void That Is the Self
In this section, I will briefly discuss Hegel's master-slave dialectic, specifically its implications for a negative theory of the self. Then, I will turn to Jean-Luc Nancy's related theory of negative self-relation and self-differentiation, which I will argue is in fact the ontological precondition for both identity and difference. The negativity of this self-relation will finally be examined in depth.
The master-slave dialectic is perhaps the most important moment in the entire Phenomenology of Spirit, consisting in the all-important transition from animal consciousness to properly human self-consciousness. As such, it is the pivotal point in Hegel's project, since he must be able to describe the development of self-consciousness from its very first beginning in order to adequately theorize the historical dialectic of Geist's coming to perfect self-knowledge. The master-slave dialectic proceeds as follows:
Primitive human consciousness relates to the world negatively, in the sense that hunger is sated by “negating” some other, in that case food. Put more generally, consciousness negates a given other in its assimilation of that other; the brute fact is negatively related to consciousness, and henceforth the thing that was immediate to consciousness becomes mediated. However, in animal consciousness the negation is an instantaneous one—the thing negated is more or less immediately destroyed or absolutely negated. The important thing is that what is negated is not seen to be any more than the brute fact, the other. All this changes, however, when multiple consciousnesses interact. Two consciousness, each seeking to negate the other, meet in what can only for Hegel be a bloody battle. The two consciousnesses fight it out, the end result of which may be one of two things: one combatant may die, and in this case the dialectic does not progress; or the victorious combatant may allow the loser to live, in which case the winner becomes a master and the loser a slave.
It is this second case that is interesting, because in it there lies dormant an important development of self-consciousness. The master, who was perhaps after recognition (this teleological goal is in fact not necessary, but it is very important to Hegel), finds that he cannot get it from such a lowly slave, who is by that account more animal than human. Since the master does not recognize the slave's consciousness, the slave is in turn not in a position to recognize the master's. In reality, there must be a mutual recognition for self-consciousness to exist. All is not lost, however, and in fact the slave undergoes a major transformation: the slave is penetrated with the fear of death, the absolute negation of consciousness. The slave experiences in its innermost being the trembling that unsettles all sureness and all ground. However, the slave does not die but rather lives in fear of death, and thus lives with some idea of the truth of absolute negation, of the loss of self that death must bring: “This complete perturbation of [the slave's] entire substance, this absolute dissolution of all its stability into fluent continuity, is, however, the simple, ultimate nature of self-consciousness, absolute negativity, pure self-referent existence...” (Hegel 237).
Furthermore, the slave labors for the master, creating mediated products that the master consumes in an only immediate relation, e.g., the slave prepares the food which the master eats. The slave thus determinately negates things, whereas the master only absolutely negates them. The labor of the slave transforms the way it relates to objects: “The negative relation to the object passes into the form of the object, into something that is permanent and remains; because it is just for the labourer that the object has independence” (Hegel 238). In other words, the negations carried out by the slave in labor become mediations of the absolute negativity of death and the other: “But this objective negative element is precisely the alien, external reality, before which it trembled. Now, however, it destroys this extraneous alien negative, affirms and sets itself up as a negative in the element of permanence, and thereby becomes for itself a self-existent being” (Hegel 239). The slave assimilates the given other into itself in a new way, a way based not upon abstract negation but upon what I will call a standing negation, a more or less permanent relation to objects. Thus, the result of the master-slave dialectic is an understanding of the self as negativity, namely that which has lived the absolute negativity which shook it loose from an immediate relation to objects and which thus labors in a way that brings the given other into itself.
Taking leave of Hegel's text and turning to Alexandre Kojève's reading, we might say that the key element in the master-slave dialectic is desire, as that which can be escape the given: “Now, the only thing that goes beyond the given reality is Desire itself” (5). This going-beyond reality finds its fullest expression in self-consciousness, which can be thought of as the desire of desire. One desires not just a given thing, not just some object, whether a product of labor or not, but the desire of the other, e.g., one desires to be the object of another's love. This relation is of one negating-negativity to another, and decidedly not to a positive given. The mutual recognition here conceived is the logical and historical development of the master-slave dialectic, what both Kojève and Hegel believe to be the truly human aspect of consciousness. This is the standing negation not only between a slave and his works, but between two or more negating-negativities, each recognizing the negativity of the other as desire.
Nancy's subject, despite his origins in deconstruction, is not written in erasure, but rather occupies a central place in his philosophy. However, far from a stable ground, the self is restless: “'Self' cannot precede itself, because 'self' is precisely the form and movement of a relation to self, of a going to self and a coming to self” (Nancy 4). The self or subject for Nancy is negating-negativity, but this in a way quite different from that in Hegel's own theory. Nancy's subject is rather “what (or the one who) dissolves all substance” (5). This negating-negativity is thus not one that assimilates the given, or even whose desire is related to the desire of another, but one that destroys all givens without thereby making the given its own; rather, negation is carried out “in order to make [the given other] a nongiven-other” (Nancy 58). The moment of synthesis is thus de-emphasized, and indeed the unsettling mediation is carried out in both cases by the act of constituting self-hood, be it that of a traditional Kantian subject or that of Nancy's world-as-self, which I will return to in section III.
Instead of a prior act of identification which produces the non-identical as that which cannot be assimilated into the conceptual or otherwise symbolic scheme, there is in Nancy rather an act that is both self-differentiation and the striving to overcome that differentiation. In other words, there is not identity but similarity, a failed identity: “In order to be in truth, and to have or to make sense, self must be self as such: and it must be so in taking distance in order to posit itself as something like what it is” (Nancy 43). The act of self-positing is thus fundamentally an act of similarity, wherein self-differentiation is the precondition for that similarity. The result is a striving for being-what-one-is, where that identity of the self is fundamentally unattainable. Importantly, the goal of the self is not given, but rather posited and thus always already caught up in restlessness, always already mediated. This is the subject's negativity, it's always being ungiven. For Hegel, the subject experienced the void of negating-negativity, e.g., in the experience of death as the absolute master. For Nancy, there is no subject as a separate persisting entity that could experience its negating-negativity as a disembodied watcher. In other words, the subject is constituted in the action of negation for Nancy in a way that is not present for Hegel—this is the step beyond Hegel that Nancy takes in his destabilization of the concrete given, even as it is found in someone as radical and negative as Hegel.
This discussion of the subject leads us to the activity of the subject in its interaction with the world, in which activity it is constituted. The name for this transcendental precondition and fundamental activity is sense: “[Sense] is the appropriation of being by the subject, as subject” (Nancy 50). This means that sense is a passage, a movement, a relation. It is all these things, but it is also the horizon of being. The details of this concept must be left to section V, although suffice it to say that sense as plane of immanent contact will be a recurring theme throughout the remainder of this paper.
III. Thought & Manifestation
The negativity of the subject having been explored, we now turn to the difficult place of thought in such a scheme. It will be seen that thought is a particularly important form of negation, as it is in thought that the problem of manifestation, the dichotomy of essence and appearance, appears as necessity. To this end, I will first examine the status of the world as a self and thus as its own self-diremption. Then, I will elaborate the related problems of manifestation and thought, each inseparably bound to the other.
The world is not a subsisting, static reality, but rather is always a going-into-other: “...it is because the world undergoes itself as a world of separation that its experience takes the form of the self” (4). Echoes of Hegel's theory of the Absolute as subject are here perceivable, but we must remember that Nancy's self is not one that is human or would have its boundaries defined and hence exist all to itself as a stable ground. Rather, the world in its becoming is nothing but infinite self-relation, referring to nothing outside itself. The self-identity of the world is only constituted in its utter going-out-of-self, and indeed the absolute is “equal to self and, consequently, in absolute repose—but it is so only thus, quite exactly, as nonrepose” (Nancy 12); this is Hegel's bacchanalian revel, the condition of Spirit itself. This Spirit, which for Hegel was both the act of the world coming to ultimate self-consciousness and that self-consciousness as result, becomes for Nancy somewhat the opposite: “Spirit is not something separate... because it itself is nothing other than separation. It is separation as the opening of relation” (19). The originary (although beginningless) self-differentiation is what is important, not the closing of relation that could declare its own ending as the absolute ending of difference. Spirit is instead the totality of the world in its aspect of infinity: “[Spirit] names infinite relation itself, the step out of self into the other of all reality” (Nancy 19).
However, this other only exists within the world itself, as its other. The totality of all-related-to-all forms one giant closed system that is however opened by its own difference from itself. The objectivity of negation consists in this, that the world, not being grounded in something outside itself, is always already caught up in itself, in its own groundlessness. No longer being a thing separated from sense and thus able to have sense, the world has rather become sense, and this sense is nothing but its own self-differentiation.
The relation between essence and appearance can never again be thought as that between transcendent-unmanifest and immanent-manifested. Rather, manifestation constantly destroys its own ground: “The singularity of manifestation, or of the world: it is that singularity manifests itself to nothing other than itself, or to nothing. Manifestation surges up out of nothing, into nothing” (Nancy 33). Characteristic here is what I will term “iterative manifestation”, wherein there is an endless deferral of essence: each thing is forced into the act of being an essence, which of course is a burden that absolutely cannot be shouldered. However, this impossibility does not just stand as it is, but rather each essence, in a necessary act, appears. This appearance is thereafter forced to become the essence of a further thing, because it too must participate in the infinity of essences which constitutes restlessness.
In other words, there is a continual move from essence to appearance, a continual process of manifestation where each thing's becoming has no end goal that would absolve it of being an essence, that would solidify the essence-appearance relation. Teleological unfolding is thus a reality of manifestation that however does not have an end goal: “One cannot rest content with reducing Hegel to his well-known, too well known, sentences on the truth of the acorn in the oak. For the tree itself is still a passage, and it also has its truth in a fallen and crushed acorn that will never take root, simple disseminated concretion” (Nancy 15). Each moment of becoming is not wholly unrelated but the movement of an endless teleology, in which the goal is only the starting point for another such process, and so on ad infinitum. It is however not as clean and neat as all that, because as Nancy notes, each process is absolutely not just that single process: each striving for the goal at the same time puts out a great mass of different and irreducible strivings, a splintering of teleology as it were. In the winding self-inversions of the infinite dissemination of manifestation, no single aspect remains as it was, nothing remains unchanged.
We now turn to thought, an especially difficult aspect of Nancy's philosophy. For Nancy, thought is the act which unsettles substance: “If thought was not separated from things, it would not be thought, nor would there be restlessness. Thought, to the contrary, is the separation of things and the ordeal of this separation” (13). From this we glean two perhaps controversial claims: thought has what initially appears to be a different status from non-thought in its ability to separate and to be constituted in separation; and the separation effected by thought is a painful one. It must be kept in mind, however, that Nancy's world is a self and is in fact Spirit and therefore thought; the human subject has no monopoly on these terms, and indeed abstraction is carried out in every objective social identification as discussed in section V. With this clarification, I will deal with each of the preceding claims in turn.
Thought thinks the thing, and in doing so penetrates into the thing, into its ground. However, this ground is only the void: “The thing thought is the thing hollowed out...” (Nancy 22). There is no stable essence which would be found at the depth. Thought is the very presence of this absence, the being-there of the nothingness that exists at the innermost center of the thing. Thinking thus changes everything, it destroys any givenness of the other, positing instead the other-as-mediated. This alteration cannot be avoided, because even what appears to be the thought of pure identity must move between the things identified—it must think them, and therefore alter them irreparably. Thought is thus the action of negating-negativity carried out upon the objects of the world, constituted as such by the differentiation of that thought itself. On the other hand, it is not only the object of thought that is penetrated: “The one who penetrates is himself penetrated, for thought is the thought of being itself, and not 'mine'” (Nancy 17). Thought must think the concreteness of the object, and it cannot do this by remaining in its abstract self-equality, for “Thought will therefore be equality that takes leave of itself in order to enter into the inequality of the thing” (Nancy 21). Thought must not be the unpenetrated, for that would turn it into a bad positivity, the refusal of thought to be the thought of being, to be thought thinking itself. This positivity is bad because its refusal to acknowledge its own self-relation which alone is that by which it is constituted. Without this reflexive relation, the mutual penetration of thought and thing, thought has not come into its full expression, does not deserve to even be called “thought”. Thus, thought is the relation constitutive of the self, which was earlier discussed as Spirit, as the opening of relation (to self). In the last analysis, then, thought as mutual penetration is seen to be the activity constantly carried out by the world itself—the world does not believe in its own reason, and this in the name of reason itself, where reason is the movement whereby thought hollows out the thing.
We come here to the question of knowledge, to the struggle between presentation and representation. For Nancy, knowledge is decidedly presentation, “and consequently the negation of every and all given presence, be it that of an 'object' or 'subject'. Not given presence, but the gift of presence—such are the stakes” (11). It is interesting that presentation here is not taken in a positive sense, and that presentation in fact negates all presence. This point may be interpreted as affirming the nothingness which is at the heart of manifestation. All presence is negated just as all absence is negated, and what is left is the relation of presentation itself: “Neither purely present (and thus evanescent) presence, nor purely absent (and thus imposing) absence, but the absolute of presentation” (Nancy 23). Thought, in conforming with the thing in its very self-separation, “represents” nothing, and this in two ways: it is not a representation of an outside thing of which it would be the knowledge or truth; and insofar as it is a representation, it is the representation of the nothingness at the center of every manifestation.
Thus, in an important sense, the presentation-representation dichotomy is irreparably transformed by the act of penetration. There is striving for representation in all thought, but at the same time thought separates itself from what it would represent, in order to enter into a relation of representation with that thing. The transformation of the dichotomy is thus carried out in an optimistic gesture that at the same time, if one looks closely enough, betrays its own caustic sarcasm. This is the meaning of Nancy's second claim in his definition of thought given above, namely that thought is the ordeal of its own separation from things. This is, I believe, predicated on the claim of thought to be representation, which thereby, as stated above, is an impossibility as far as the success of that representation is concerned.
One last important point in Nancy's rereading of Hegel is that of trembling, already encountered in the context of Hegel's master-slave dialectic. There, we saw that the trembling of the slave in the face of abject negativity was indispensable for the formation of the subject, of self-consciousness. For Nancy, trembling takes on a more all-pervasive function: “Trembling is the act of being-affected—a passive acting that merely makes the body vibrate, that unsettles substance” (44). The action of negativity upon the concrete is a causing-to-tremble: “Negativity makes all determinateness tremble” (Nancy 45). The mutual penetration produced in thought is inseparable from mutual trembling. For Hegel, the unsettling of substance that is trembling was produced in abstract recognition; for Nancy, recognition becomes a touching, always already trembling: “I only recognize myself recognized by the other to the extent that this recognition of the other alters me: it is desire, it is what trembles in desire” (64). The desiring of the other's desire is not a disconnected happening but a touching, a sharing of sense that is thus a contact-between. Desiring is a relation wherein neither term remains unchanged, but rather both, in their recognition and therefore in their self-constitutions, become thereby self-differentiated as described above in the section on self.
IV. Immanence & Transcendence: The Infinite Sense of Self-Relation
The question of immanence and transcendence in Nancy's philosophy must now be broached. In this section, I will first explicate Nancy's transcendental immanence of sense. Then, I will briefly discuss its relation to transcendence and to immanence commonly understood. In that discussion, the question of negative immanence will be raised and answered.
In our interactions with the world, we are always being-toward that world. This means that objects, phenomena, signifiers, and so on, all already make sense in some way. Sense is the transcendental precondition by which individual fields or groupings of activities may take place. Sense can be conceived as the field of immanence, the self-relation of totality thus being the infinite relation of sense. This infinity is the same in principle as Hegel's true infinity—in other words, it is the infinitude of all finitude, and as such is achieved through self-relation rather than through indefinite extension. However, this infinitude is not, as it might seem, a positivity: “But the act of the infinite is anything but a given. It is, indeed, rather that by which the given is given” (Nancy 25). The transcendental condition of the given is seen here to be pure mediation, the pure non-givenness of the always open totality. Signification is in this case a hierarchical appearance that occurs only after the horizontal opening of sense, which is therefore a relation between. Things only appear (perhaps necessarily) as transcendent, and their very transcending is provided for by immanent relation. The way that Nancean concepts are developed in the rereading of Hegel is instructive as to this fact: what appear to be definitions of concepts in terms of other concepts, straightforward equivalences, are actually ways to get thought moving (Morin 5).
The connection to Hegel's method is clear, in that Hegel's Logic is nothing but a mass of speculative equivalences which are not for that reason static. The development of Hegel's categories proceeds by the working-out of implications whose differences only become apparent in their being made equivalent. For Nancy's immanence, this means that the sliding of the signifier, or of the concept, creates or opens sense rather than signification. The working-out of the concept could not be a true transcendence, but rather is a movement across a sort of transcendental space. Thought is thus an interesting case in relation to this trans-immanence, in that, as noted above, it is always a presentation (Darstellung). For Hegel, too, thought as form could not be truly separated from its content, the Concept (or Notion) being that category in which the moments of going-into-other became explicitly recognized. The experience of sense is thus always already movement of thought in this case, or of the self-differentiation which is the precondition of self.
In any case, the negativity of Nancy's immanence should by now be apparent. A given opacity nowhere comes into the picture, sense always being a movement-between, a point of contact which does not become a static term. All is motion, restless becoming, and as such is completely lacking in that pseudo-concretion produced by the incessant insistence of “being-there” or “dasein”. Infinity cannot be extracted from relation and from plurality, as if such a process could yield the concrete singularity which was singular in or as itself. On the contrary, there can be nothing in itself, because of the necessary plurality of “self” itself. Thus the infinite singularity of the point of contact, the passage that is sense, is at the same time the failure of that singularity to be truly singular—rather, it too is a plurality, try as it might to be otherwise. This is a prerequisite and a symptom of the bottomlessness of manifestation and of course of being itself.
V. Reflections on Identity
Finally, we can address the problem of identity within Nancy's theory of negative immanence and manifestation. Identification is carried out constantly in thought and in social practice, and this necessary but impossible process must be explored. In this section, I will first recapitulate the impossibility of identity and the nonetheless frequently-made move of identification. Then I will elaborate on the previously-mentioned theme of similarity as a way to understand the failure of identity. Finally, I will discuss the possibilities of an escape from identity and a Nancean ethics.
Identity is an impossibility because to be the same as oneself, one must be different, must undergo differentiation that opens the possibility of self-relation. It is, as noted, an act of positing, and hence finds its theoretical ancestry in Hegel's doctrine of the positedness of all things, which he equated with thought or Spirit. The striving for identity that would, In Hegel, culminate in Absolute Spirit, or at least the ordered totality of all relations in its thus constituted self-relation, cannot however be accepted by us today. Spirit, which was the dialectical agent of identification as process and at the same time the absolutely undialectical success of that very identification, has been rightly criticized elsewhere. Nancy would rather revive the critique of the teleological starting-point-and-result (they necessarily go together in Hegel) while keeping the process of identification intact: “Thus 'I=I' means nothing, or only this: passage and leap into the other of what was never in itself. This leap is unsettling twice over: in the agitation of its movement, where there is no continuity that would not also be the laceration of a burst of light, and in the nonknowing of the other that thus makes up all of self-knowing” (Nancy 39).
Identity is the movement of the always-already moved, and is thus a necessary movement. At the same time, it is only movement, and it is paradoxically movement between things which were never self-identical, eternally unable to become self-identical since relation is always already open. In other words, one cannot pass from infinite self-relation, which is reality, to anything less than that, to anything that would be merely finite or unself-related and hence self-identical (if such a thing even makes sense). Every thought, furthermore, is an identification, yet again this is nothing but a movement-between—when I say something “is” something else, thought passes between the two things dynamically. This movement, when considered only representationally, entails a violence towards the particularities of the things in question. However, for an ontologically presentational theory of thinking, the result is first of all movement-into-other, and only second does the appearance of representation take place. This second moment is that of successful identification, of identity itself, but we have already seen why this is impossible.
The social reality of identity is nothing but the proclamation that such identity has been reached and the social effects following from this proclamation. The example of socially necessary abstract labor time found in Marx is here instructive. Concrete, particular labors are abstracted by the capitalist mode of production to yield a homogeneous labor that can thereby be measured against all (or nearly all) other capitalist labor. The diverse concrete labors are of course not the same, but they are treated as if they were by economic processes, and therefore their identity becomes a sort of truth as far as objective social determination is concerned. The power of limiting and controlling labors is predicated on this ability to proclaim, and even to convince oneself and others, that socially necessary abstract labor is the real quantity underlying productive processes, the quantity that thereby controls the movement of capital. In this manner does the illusion become reality, does it become “real illusion” as Marx has called it. Of course, it is not only socially necessary abstract labor time that undergoes the process of social identification, becoming real illusion; sexual identity, race, gender, &c., i.e., any institutionalized and therefore socially objective abstraction-making process produces the appearance of identity. So it is important to understand that the impossibility of identity does not in objective fact deny its influence, only its ontological or metaphysical status, and this is why it is “illusion” that is nonetheless real in its effects and power to organize human relations.
What could be the possibility of an escape from identity? Ignoring overtly practical considerations, we may rather ask as to the possibility of a Nancean ethics. Indeed, Nancy's thinking of freedom and of the “we” provides just such a thing. Freedom for Nancy is not produced by pure determinacy (and there is nothing that is not determined) but is the act of infinite determination itself, of the non-given infinite (74). Freedom is not a decision between two givens, and indeed the self as a thing or as given cannot by that token be considered free. Furthermore, the subject cannot escape its involvement with the world, its being-toward as decisiveness: “I do not therefore decide in favor of things proposed as possible, because I exist as 'me' only in my decision” (Nancy 74). Freedom is non-given and, more importantly, ungiveable. Thus, the subject as such cannot be free, and indeed no concrete being can be free, because freedom is abstract negativity, the void at the heart of the subject. Freedom, in other words, is brought about in the very penetration of negativity into thought, and of thought into negativity: “The freedom of decision is the very thing that thought, in order to begin or end, has to penetrate” (Nancy 74). This is quite a curious phrase, as we know that Nancy does not take kindly to either beginnings or endings. However, this is simply saying, in the usual paradoxical but straightforward style, that
Nancy is very emphatic that the true subject of sense is not an “I” but a “we”: “A subject of sense, this means first off: a sense for each and every one, coming back to the one only insofar as it passes to the other. If 'I' surge up each time, as the identity of the universal and the singular... this takes place only insofar as 'I' is shared out equally between everyone” (37). To have or to be sense is to share sense; sense is always a sharing, and a sharing of being. It is a touching, a contact, and for this reason cannot be made into property. The “we” is the expression of this fundamental being-with that makes up the possibility of sense itself. Indeed, Nancy goes so far as to say, “The absolute is between us. It is there in itself and for itself, and, one might say, the self itself is between us” (78). The act of sharing sense is the constitutive thing here, and it's name is the “we”, or even the “absolute”, which, it is interesting to note, Nancy does not put in inverted commas. While Nancy does not, in Hegel, stray too far in this direction, it is nonetheless an interesting counterpart to Hegel's conclusions about the merging of subject and object and of Geist as self-consciousness.
Nancy's “we”, as might be guessed, is a far cry from Hegel's Sittlichkeit. Where in Hegel there existed the ordered whole of community as result, in Nancy it is a state of diffraction, reaching far beyond the concept of self-consciousness. Indeed, far from being a result, community is not even a predicate, and there is no passing-over from the non-communal to the communal (Morin 28). Thus, for Nancy, there was never a development of community, where for Hegel this was perhaps a major point of development. To this effect, Nancy writes that “we” means “the knowing that is 'for us' is knowing that is not merely 'for consciousness'” (76). We are not consciousness, conceived symbolically or otherwise—we are so much more. This more is of course our being-self, which is constituted in our contact with the other, in our sharing of sense. We are subjects of sense (in both sense of the term “subject”) long before we are consciousnesses, and even longer before we are self-consciousnesses. Nancy likens our relation to sense, our experience of sense, to a rhythm wherein our being-self or being-other (and more accurately both of these at once) is punctuated, discontinuously forming and deforming based on the point of contact: “The Nancean self, then, emerges as nothing other than this syncopated rhythm of successive instances of exposure to sense” (James 49). Consequently, this “we” is the recognition of existence, the beating out of the sharing of sense and the recognition thereof. Further, the rhythm that is always a sharing—everyone can hear the beat—is a further example of Nancy's negative thinking as an escape from the temptations of hypostasis, which is most tempting in the case of the subject even as it is perhaps the least acceptable. There is, put another way, no subject and no subjects outside of their exposure to sense; the subject is nothing but this exposure to sense, this making-oneself-available to sense and thus to truth.
VI. Conclusion
Nancy's rereading of Hegel's project can thus be seen to rely on three conceptual reconfigurations: the subject is interpreted as a fundamental being-with, always a self-diremption and therefore a self-relation; thought and manifestation are exposed in their positedness; and Hegel's completed transcendence is replaced with a striving for transcendence, with a transcending, a teleology without end or goal. Finally, all these lead to a very different interpretation of identity and the problems thereof. Nancy can be seen to be continuing what he considers the core of Hegel's project, namely the labor of the negative. This labor is one that is carried out under the auspices of the Maoist dictum “one divides into two”, a model altogether different from the traditional dialectic developed and utilized by Hegel.
First, the master-slave dialectic takes on a new form, that of dissolution of self and other, of all substance and all being. The importance of this cannot be overstressed—what is implied is nothing but the absence of the other as anything but myself: “This is why desire cannot become what it is in an object, in a given determination. It is desire of the other self-consciousness. The subject is desire of the subject, and there is no object of desire. Desire is appropriative becoming in the other” (Nancy 61). In other words, the interesting thing is that subjects confront subjects in a relation that cannot be described in terms of the old polar subject-object schema. Rather, there is a towardness in the relationship—for Nancy, being is neither an in-itself or a for-itself, but fundamentally a being-toward. We are toward the other, but this does not solidify us in an opposition. On the other hand, we are in an opposition nonetheless: “The concretion of negativity begins with the other” (Nancy 57). Difference is always such only under the aspect of similarity.
Second, Nancy's ontology moves beyond the conceptual or symbolic prison in which Hegel's philosophy was trapped. Here there is no presupposition of the conceptual nature of all reality, and in fact Nancy's philosophy is a rebellion against this conceptual or, more relevant for his intellectual milieu, the symbolic order. His post-phenomenological views of being-with and being-towards are here instructive. Further, Nancy's subject offers an escape from the cynical subject of psychoanalysis, being actually quite optimistic in comparison.
Third, Nancy opens up the possibility of striving and of what can only be a beautiful failure, the failure of identity. Rather than an untying of elements, a letting-loose of the content of his philosophy, Nancy thinks always under the aspect of failure. In other words, he feels acutely the loss of the whole, the loss of the totality as it could exist for Hegel. Nancy is the theorist of loss and failure for our age much as Walter Benjamin was for his.
A future study of Nancy would do well to take a number of things into account not contained in the present paper: the problematic nature of being-with and its possible lack of critical power, which problem however I believe to be solvable; the relation of Nancy's ontology to various concrete social structures, and the related problem of ideology critique that seems in danger of being lost (of course it is already lost in its traditional form, but perhaps it is possible to be recuperated); the possibilities of revolutionary practice that follow from Nancy's philosophy, as Nancy is committed to the loosely-defined far left (having written something, for example, for the conference “The Communist Horizon”); and, perhaps most interesting, the various intersections and contradictions between Nancy's thinking of negativity and that of Theodor Adorno's negative dialectics, as well as the related position of positivity, which is typically preferred in contemporary theories of immanence and difference.
Works Cited
Adorno, Theodor. Negative Dialectics. Trans. E. B. Ashton. Seabury Press, 1973. Print.
Hegel, G. W. F. The Phenomenology of Mind. Trans. J. B. Baillie. New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1967. Print.
James, Ian. The Fragmentary Demand: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Jean-Luc Nancy. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2006. Print.
Morin, Marie-Eve. Jean-Luc Nancy. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2012. Print.
Nancy, Jean-Luc. Hegel: The Restlessness of the Negative. Trans. Jason Smith & Steven Miller. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002. Print.

Tuesday, December 3, 2013

The Infinity of Essences & the Problem of Similarity

Here is a paper I recently wrote for a comparative literature class:
The Infinity of Essences & the Problem of Similarity
I. Introduction
When all possibility of identity has been discounted—and discounted it has been—there must remain a category that could explain, if nothing else, the appearance of identity, or what is the same thing, the appearance of the dichotomy of essence and appearance. Even setting aside questions of the ontological status of identity versus non-identity, one is confronted with the problem of objective appearance, specifically and most problematically that of the much-derided self-identity. In this paper, I argue that “similarity” (and likewise “imitation” and “likeness”) fulfills this cynical role, offering the possibility of nuanced analyses for projects as diverse as semiology, historical materialism, and even post-phenomenological or post-deconstructive theory. Said more concretely, similarity is the ontological precondition of both identity and non-identity, and is the constitutive reality of self-relation conceived as infinite.
Thus, I will unfold the concept of similarity with respect to three thinkers: Walter Benjamin, specifically looking at the primarily distorting effects of similarity; Roland Barthes, focusing on the problem of self-imitation relating to photography but also to all types of image; and Jean-Luc Nancy, who will feature prominently in the discussions of the previous two thinkers, but who will also be discussed on his own as a final clarification of what is at stake in the problem of similarity.
II. Walter Benjamin: Similarity as Distortion & The Copy
The first modality of similarity I will examine is that of similarity qua distortion in the work of Walter Benjamin. In perhaps the paradigmatic example of this modality, Benjamin writes, “[Proust] lay on his bed racked with homesickness, homesick for the world distorted in the state of resemblance” (Illuminations 205). Proust's undoing, according to Benjamin, was his attachment to the narrative structure of similarity, the contextualization that lends all elements under a single historical heading (and indeed there only ever tends to be one such heading!), a unitary essence. The apparent singularity of the essence is deceiving, however, as this essence is inevitably the barest universal abstraction which in the end can signify absolutely nothing, as written in the official historiography of the bourgeoisie. Proust's illness here stands in for what may be considered the bourgeois pathology, the class necessity of the myth of progress. Resemblance is thus that state of contextualized essentialism that reduces particularity to abstract universality. In this movement, according to Benjamin, what is sheared off is the real context of the thing, in other words, its decontextualized, bare particularity. Nothing less than true history is here at stake, the logic of things as they happen. Perhaps better than particularity, which has a long history of assimilation, and indeed exists in discourse as the subsumed element in the universal, we should say peculiarity. Whereas particularity designates, in Adorno for example, the element that is not taken up into the universal, peculiarity will be used to designate the singularity of essence.
No discussion of similarity can do without the notion of copy, of mimesis, and in the context of Benjamin's thought, of technical reproducibility: “The technique of reproduction detaches the reproduced object from the domain of tradition. By making many reproductions it substitutes a plurality of copies for a unique existence” (Benjamin, Illuminations 221). It appears that this phenomenon is analogous to that of the destruction of peculiarity effected by the narrative structure of bourgeois (or orthodox Marxist) understanding of reality. There is here a bizarre although unsurprising mimesis of mimesi, an imitation of imitations, a second-order movement and not simply a horizontal chain. First of all there is the destruction of difference, of particularity, and then on top of this there exists the wholesale destruction of peculiarity. We shall return to this in our discussion of Roland Barthes. For now, though, it is sufficient to draw attention to the historical connection, wherein photography appears as the perfect outgrowth of the age: “Every day the urge grows stronger to get hold of an object at very close range by way of its likeness, its reproduction” (Benjamin, Illuminations 223). Benjamin here presents the paradoxical insight that every separation is a bringing-close, every separation into original and copy, whether that original exists or not, is a touching, a penetration. In other words, there is always something different between a thing and its copy
But what exactly is lost in similarity? On the one hand, peculiarity is dissolved, that which would be the singular essence of the thing. But there is more than that, particularly when we take the subject of a photographic portrait into account. Benjamin uses the metaphor of the gaze to describe just such a loss in the move between thing and copy: “...the camera records our likeness without returning our gaze” (Illuminations 188). A similarity results, but something important is missing—this lost element is nothing less than the mutual recognition constitutive of self-consciousness and thereby of the human. Further, this is the production of the standing negation of the self as that which experiences firsthand the absolutely negative both in near-death experience and in the desiring of the other's desire. Perhaps alarmingly, the likeness produced by the camera is one that is lacking in both its recognition of the other and, more imporantly, the other's recognition of it—it is lacking in lack, its substance does not exteriorize itself but appears to sit still. Thus the gaze of the photographed subject is decidedly not a human gaze, but rather the countenance of the suffering that is separation, the tremendous pain undergone in the offering of an unreturned humanity. This return is more generally rendered impossible by the dissolving of all stable substance that could go out of itself only to return unchanged to its point of origin, itself unchanging; this restlessness is not limited just to photography, and will be discussed below.
As mentioned previously, the image of the dream world takes the role of the non-symbolic in Benjamin, where the symbolic structures (narrative consciousness) that dominate waking life are absent: “The similarity of one thing to another which we are used to, which occupies us in a wakeful state, reflects only vaguely the deeper resemblance of the dream world in which everything that happens appears not in identical but in similar guise, opaquely similar one to another” (Illuminations 204). Distortion by similarity as was effected by the waking drive towards pompous historiography is here contrasted with what is dubbed a “deeper resemblance”. Unfortunately, the elaboration of this dream world remains difficult, and even, as Benjamin himself admits, “opaque”. The suspension of self-consciousness which is instantaneously produced by the click of the camera tears the viewer of the photograph from the waking world and places him in the confused expanse of the dream world wherein there is nothing but the unwavering gaze of an infinity of eyes, invoking an infinity of associations none of which give the promise of what can only be a reified fidelity. Thus the absence of all context as the real context of a thing does not result in nothingness, as if that absence would imply a void or lack of manifestation. Rather, there exists what may be termed the presence of that contextual absence, the Nancean infinity of sense—the fundamental lack of a ground guaranteed to be such by the restlessness of infinite self-relation. We might say that manifestation would continue manifesting in the absence of all context qua death of singular essence, as the pure negativity of the infinite going-out-of-self. This would be the unending upsurge of peculiarity. Perhaps this is what Benjamin means when he writes, in “The Doctrine of the Similar”, that “the perception of similarities thus seems to be bound to a moment in time... it must be grasped in an instant”. Thus, contra both Wittgenstein and Lacan, there is no limiting regime such as nonsense or the Real which would be unsymbolizable due to its definition as against what can be said, i.e., the symbolic. The dream world (but also perhaps the gestus or the surrealist montage) is not an attempt at the saying of the unsayable, it is not even a frenzied but futile extension of the finger towards unspeakable horror—or rather, it is both those things brought to bear against the tangled mass of existence which has always-already said the unsayable, and which has likewise long since replaced the unsymbolizable with the as-of-yet-unsymbolized, or even the as-of-right-this-moment-unsymbolized.
Benjamin's stripping of all context from the thing can be seen as the prerequisite for the following arguments based on Barthes and Nancy. In the next section, Barthes' Camera Lucida—the work is lucid only as lucid dreaming—will provide an indispensible view on the double-movement of disappointment and necessity inherent in self-imitation. Following this, Nancy's Hegel: The Restlessness of the Negative will open the way to understanding both the always-already of self-imitation that nonetheless supercedes identity and the infinite becoming of all things, which things spiral through themselves and through their uncountable offshoots in constantly splintering teleologies without reference to an end-goal outside of that becoming. It must, however, be kept in mind that none of these developments are a proper resolution of the problem, as that problem's core paradox is the impossibility of resolution into self. Rather, the following developments should be thought of as different modalities of the problem of similarity.
III. Roland Barthes: The Image as Imitation
The second modality of similarity I will examine is that of the image and imitation in Roland Barthes, particularly the self-imitation forced upon the subject of photography by the technical conditions of the medium. This self-imitation takes form as the result of a misidentification, or rather of a confusion of peculiarity for any and all presentation or self-externalization whatsoever. Describing the ordeal of self-diremption effected by being photographed, Barthes writes
In front of the lens, I am at the same time: the one I think I am, the one I want other to think I am, the one the photographer thinks I am, and the one he makes use of to exhibit is art. In other words, a strange action: I do not stop imitating myself, and because of this, each time I am (or let myself be) photographed, I invariably suffer from a sensation of inauthenticity, sometimes of imposture (comparable to certain nightmares). (Camera Lucida 13)
What is immediately striking is the profusion of similarities, of likenesses, of “selves” one must imitate. Whatever else it may be, it seems that imitation is not gentle, and in fact is likened to a “micro-version of death” (Barthes, Camera Lucida 14). The image, and not only the photographic image, is the locus of a self-differentiation, which differentiation is a dreamlike echo of the problem of essence and appearance, given in technological form: “Ultimately a photograph looks like anyone except the person it represents. For resemblance refers to the subject's identity, an absurd, purely legal, even penal affair...” (Barthes, Camera Lucida 102). The absurd legal affair Barthes speaks of is the paucity of the photographed individual, who is “...neither subject nor object but a subject who feels like he is becoming an object...” (Camera Lucida 14). This becoming of an object is inseparable from the act of self-externalization, from the very production of the image. There can be no externalization, however, with the complementary notion of the internal: “...depth is inseparable from the strength to externalize oneself” (Adorno 106-107). By this (through the lens of my own interpretation) is meant two things: self-externalization is the projection of the image, the positing of the self (this will be important) from which true depth is produced, in which what may be termed the appearance of essence and appearance finds its basis; and the perhaps paradoxical truth that before the projection of the image one is not identical to oneself, insofar as identity is nothing but its own positing, it's own (problematic) presupposition. Speaking of an old picture of his mother, Barthes writes, “She did not struggle with her image, as I do with mine: she did not suppose herself” (Camera Lucida 67). To suppose the self—this is the sin against the peculiar, but perhaps piety is not as easily attained as Barthes might have us believe. The very notion that some picture is a picture of me already implies the violence of the entire symbolic universe. This violence is the dissociation of peculiarity, of consciousness as absolute negativity and hence as freedom, from the given determinations of the individual symbolic subject: “For the photograph is the advent of myself as other: a cunning dissociation of consciousness from identity” (Barthes, Camera Lucida 12). This self-as-other, it is absolutely crucial to keep in mind, is the identification of the object (the “externalization”) with the subject (the “internal”), appearing in this context as a misidentification that has always-already been made. The immense power of photography in this regard was thus its ability to capture people.
Besides this violent difference-and-identification—which must of course go together on the structuralist model—there is the question of the dream world, of that which would overflow all context, all narrative, and in Barthes' case also all myth. Here is what Barthes has to say about the similarity of the dream world: “The almost: love's dreadful regime, but also the dream's disappointing status—which is why I hate dreams” (Camera Lucida 66). There is always a double-movement with photography, that of identification of subject and image-object on the one hand, and on the other the struggle of the almost, a catastrophic undoing of that identification. Furthermore, the subject-becoming-object in a photograph is the timeless guarantee of failure in the great labor of externalizing the self. Returning to dreams, Barthes has this to say about his mother: “I dream about her, I do not dream her” (Camera Lucida 66). The individual in all her peculiarity is only pointed to even in the dream—a bigger failure could not be imagined. Even stripped of all context, even placed gently down into the dream world by the unconscious, Barthes cannot recreate her presence, her peculiarity. The problem lies in the botched transplantation between the waking and dream worlds. First, the sharedness of the world and of sense demands that the subject in reality be a “we”. So it is not as if Barthes cannot dream his mother because there is an uncrossable gulf between people. Second, the dream-image of Barthes' mother could never give off the peculiarity that his real living mother did because it is the nature of peculiarity to be singular, and the identification of the dream-figure with his mother was false by and through that very identification. While Barthes was with his living mother, her presence was externalized and sense was shared between them in their peculiar contact with one another—in death, there was only the dream-image, no better than the photograph; both images are false by their overbearing demand for the conformity of the other, for immediate and total subjugation of the living other to that other's own voiceless echo.
In “The Agency of the Letter in the Unconscious, or Reason Since Freud”, Jacques Lacan famously claimed that “the unconscious is structured like a language”. The unconscious activity of the dream world, however, is decidedly not a language, or rather it is a language that has gone out into its other so completely that the deferral of signifiers to their others for the sought-after meaning happens at one single instant, a static shock exploding out from the darkened void, coursing through the edgeless emptiness, and dissipating into a new zero-point of relations. The dream world may not be coterminous with dreams commonly understood—all the better! The infinity of sense is not something to imagine anyway. Instead, it is a physical contact between bodies, the sharing of peculiarity between them (essence is necessary as the internal precondition of the manifestations that touch one another). Returning to Barthes' distress over his dream-mother, we may say that even the divine gaze able to hold the entirety of all semiological signs simultaneously in view could not produce one single ounce of what is peculiar. For this, the reality of manifestation is needed, a self-differentiation and subsequent identification that does dance garishly on the false surface of the sign. There must be a vertical movement, even if in the end that movement was only the false appearance thereof.
Barthes' cynicism regarding the emancipatory possibility of the similarity of the dream world would seem thus to be the outcome of a (largely correct, I believe) ascription of imperialistic would-be hegemony to the symbolic order, to the always-already invoked sign-chains analyzed so virtuosically in Mythologies. There is, indeed, no such thing as a meta-language, even as there is the movement towards such a structure. It was in this sense that I spoke of the mimesis of mimesi in the previous section—we are now in a position to deal with this concept more thoroughly. Previously, we noted that there was a mimesis, a striving for identity, between the mimesis of bourgeois historiography and the mimesis of the photographic image/copy. That earlier statement, that flawed sureness that the self-understanding of the bourgeoisie was the essence or base of which the cultural (or even technological!) superstructure was a mimetic appearance, brings us to a declaration: the striving-each-into-the-other of meta-language and language (or of essence and appearance). This imaginary limit, this locus at which identity would finally be self-identical, is the mimesis of all mimesi, a universal identification of identifications, but on that account also its own undoing. That which imitates imitation is not on that account less successful, as if there were a ground at which imitation could be definitively separated from meta-imitation. Rather, the success of imitation heightens to the extent that peculiarity and particularity are successively made to disappear. So there is a tendency within things to approach self-identity, which is however negated in the activity of Spirit or thought as separation, or in the supremely powerful act of touching—the more abstract a relation becomes, the more peculiarity is sheared away, but the act of thought or Spirit that bursts forth cleaving substance in two is always the guarantee of symbolic distance, which distance is, paradoxically, closeness and even penetration conceived in terms of sense; the promise of concretion and manifestation is always-already made, and this suffices to unsettle substance for all eternity. Strictly speaking, it is actually quite impossible to move from infinite relationality to the lack of all relation which is the One—identity cannot exist for two reasons: it cannot be at the beginning because there can be no beginning (see following section on restlessness), everything having already begun; and it cannot be at some end because all identity is constituted only as similarity or likeness, of which the prerequisite is self-diremption. Thus, what yet remains the problem of similarity is however through the preceding analysis clarified—similarity is the problem of depth expressed with a slightly different focus and entry-point. The movement constitutive of depth is, to speak clearly, that whereby an essence becomes appearance through self-manifestation (which however does not leave it unchanged). That new appearance soon becomes the essence of a further movement of depth, and so on; the movement by which essence and appearance shift themselves about and flip over each other may be produced by temporal change or by relational changes. These winding movements produce the appearance of a meta-language at given moments in time (when a snapshot is taken or when certain behaviors are carried out as if there were a meta-language—this last possibility of existing falsity deserves a paper of its own), or due to the all-too-common artificial restriction of the field over which manifestation is to be experienced or things are to be thought. These considerations, as noted, open the possibility of treating language and meta-language as vertically-structured, separate modalities of being which demand of themselves their special treatment. As might already be apparent, such a separation is in fact impossible, made painful by its failure, even as it is absolutely necessary: “The separation that is in itself manifestation is each time a singular ordeal. As such, it is pain” (Nancy 41). Mimesis as that which, forever unheeding, gathers all mimesis unto itself, positing itself as the similarity of all similarities in an endless deferral towards the very locus of similarity, that hidden thing that finally is self-identical, the ground or essence behind manifestation which however cannot exist—this rather dense formulation brings the paradox of similarity to an intensity at which the contemporary French philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy absolutely thrives; it is to him that we now turn.
IV. Jean-Luc Nancy: Self-Similarity & Iterative Manifestation
Nancy's thought is marked by several recurring motifs which have special significance for the critique of similarity undertaken here: sense, self, and trembling. Most of these concepts were touched on in the previous sections, however this final section will generalize several of the previously-derived results and thereby provide a somewhat more rigorous justification for the earlier employment of Nancean concepts.
Sense is the term for that unmistakable phenomenon, that everything we come into contact with always-already makes sense. This making-sense is immanent, in that it references nothing pure or constitutive of that making-sense outside of itself, outside of its own self-reference. This reflexivity is a groundlessness, a restlessness which makes up the infinity of sense and causes problems for the interpretation of Nancy as holding either a philosophy of immanence or one of transcendence. Sense is infinite as described by Hegel's doctrine of true infinity, that infinity which is such in its boundless and limitless self-reference, and not in its constant deferral-onto-other, where that other (and therefore that spurious infinity!) would end up encompassing everything in its own self-identification. Rather, Nancy's infinity of sense exists not in a positive or identifying self-relation, but in a negative self-relation which is the precondition of its own groundlessness. Summarizing restlessness, Nancy writes, “The restlessness of thought first means that everything has already begun”. Refering to the problem of the always-already, the structured temporalization that accompanies all thinking of manifestation, Nancy seems at first pass to side with Barthes in his disdain of depth (we will see that this is not exactly the case). Restlessness means above all that one cannot “go back” to the beginning in thought. In other words, there is no such thing as immediacy—A thing is not given but posited, that is, mediated from the very “first” moment, which moment in fact effaces itself of itself in its unfolding.
The concept of self present in Nancy's work is a peculiar one, and this without accident: “Self is selfsame: the position of this sameness engages that of a difference, whose movement alone posits sameness. Self is as itself... self must be self as such: and it must be so in taking distance from itself in order to posit something like what it is” (Nancy 43). This is, in so many words, the fundamental problem of identity and difference, compressed into the reflexivity of the speculative remark which is, alone among all the possible configurations of language, gentle enough to preserve something as fragile as the truth. What Nancy means here is that there is an imperative, a (cosmo)logical necessity that each thing come into its own, unfold itself in the expression of its essence. However, this teleology would not be that of appearance-as-manifestation versus essence-as-transcendent-unmanifest. To the contrary, “Neither purely present (and thus evansecent) presence, nor purely absent (and thus imposing) absence, but the absolute of presentation” (Nancy 23). In other words, not everything is manifest, but all is manifesting. There is, it must be stressed, no ground of that which appears if that ground would itself be taken as unable to appear—there is an endless deferral of essence, wherein each thing takes up the thankless task of being an essence, which of course is a burden that absolutely cannot be shouldered, and thereafter the burden is passed on to the next generation, the next iteration of self-induced manifestation. The self, the paradigmatic example of the strive to be essence, must paradoxically posit itself as its own innermost essence, and it is only in this self-positing that the self becomes itself. In the same founding motion the self both posits something and mimetically identifies with that thing, thereby becoming itself. However, this becoming-self is also a becoming-other due to the impossibility of self-identity before the always-already restless—with no posited essence, there was also no thing which might have been self-identical. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the self is anything but a subject all too itself. Rather, this self-positing and therefore self-imitation, by the logic of the previous section, is the very process undergone by the world itself: “It is because the world undergoes itself as a world of separation that its experience takes the form of the 'self'” (Nancy 4). It is easy to see why this is the case, given restlessness.
In this originary self-positing, all positive ground or substance plays no role whatsoever. Briefly quoting Hegel, Nancy writes, “In its very first figure, this relation to the other, and, more precisely, this being-self-through-the-other, gives itself as that by which 'substance... is made to tremble'” (Nancy 43). To tremble, that is truly a powerful thing: it is the penetration of the absolute negativity of death into the slave that lies defeated at the feet of the master in Hegel; in Nancy, it is the self penetrated by its own taking leave of itself. Further, “trembling is the act of being-affected”, a paradoxically-stated passive-yet-active happening that is akin to the asymmetrical mediation encountered in thinkers such as Adorno and Benjamin, albeit without the backdrop of the Kantian subject.
In Nancy, the ineffable dream world is transformed into the always-already that refuses to posit a realm of the “unsymbolizable” in opposition to the “symbolic” (this would, in the way we have been speaking, reinstate reified depth), but rather collapses that distinction and posits (a significantly revised version of Hegelian) Spirit in its stead: “Spirit is not something separate... because it itself is nothing other than separation. It is separation as the opening of relation” (Nancy 19). This infinite self-relation of the world, of separation and diremption and of similarity, is nothing but the consequence of the lack of all ground, the lack of any unchanging identity which a thing could aspire to be. Needless to say, the lack of ground, the constant turnover of essences, is the very paragon of the production of peculiarities, avoiding all problems of identification brought up Benjamin in his critique of historiography. So important and fundamental is the peculiar that, ethically speaking, in a Nancean world the squandering of choice on the chimera of self-identity is nothing short of the gravest evil.

Thus the problem of similarity, which is in any case the concept of identity problematized for a brutally cynical world, is seen to be approachable from three entry points: first, that of Walter Benjamin's drive towards the destruction of narrative and the elevation of the fragmentary, exemplified in the decontextualized world of dream logic in which resemblances are of an almost mystical, ineffable character; second, that of Roland Barthes' distress over the loss of his mother even in dreams, and the second-order imitation of all imitations which iteratively produced its own falsity through self-identifications that necessarily became less and less concrete and therefore less and less real; third, Jean-Luc Nancy's infinity of sense, seen to be the infinite self-relation of totality and thus the prerequisite of both identity and difference.


Works Cited
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Barthes, Roland. Camera Lucida : Reflections on Photography. Trans. Richard Howard. New York: Hill and Wang, 1982. Print.
Barthes, Roland. Mythologies. Trans. Annette Lavers. New York: The Noonday Press, 1989. Print.
Benjamin, Walter. Illuminations. Trans. Harry Zohn. New York: Schocken Books, 2007. Print.
Benjamin, Walter. “Doctrine of the Similar.” New German Critique, No. 17 (Spring 1979): 65- 69. Web. 12 Feb. 2013.
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Nancy, Jean-Luc. Hegel: The Restlessness of the Negative. Trans. Jason Smith & Steven Miller. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002. Print.