The tendency to reduce theoretical
constructions to what is perceived as their most basic level is
deeply embedded in the minds of many. In some cases it is important
to think of things in simpler terms, as this may help the
understanding to parse difficult theories or statements. In other
cases, however, it becomes a vice. This is readily apparent—what is
not so apparent is how deep the problem really goes. To give a
personal example:
My Asian studies class was discussing
the Vietnamese diaspora, and one of my classmates raised a hand and
said, totally seriously, “I don't understand, aren't we all just
African diaspora?” The confusion continued, with people unable to
grasp that a time-period could simply be defined. They kept trying to
reduce it further back in time for no reason. The fact that we could
go further back in time to define the ancestral homeland did not mean
we had to in order to give the concept meaning. In fact, to reduce it
further back destroyed the meaning in the context of the discussion.
Why do people consistently attempt to
reduce things to basic constituents, to the “first” moment, or
other such things? It is surely a product of society, namely and
primarily the ubiquitous reduction of things to economic factors. The
violence done against phenomena in pressing them into quantitative
economic determinations is mirrored in everyday mental processes such
as trying to understand concepts like diaspora. It obviously was
understood as a concept, as it was immediately applied to Africa; my
classmate's definition was correct. However, a cognitive reflex
occurred thereafter which attempted to invalidate the concept because
it was not “objectively” defined quantitatively. The meaning of
alternative, context-sensitive definitions of time-period for use
with the concept was rejected.
Reduction destroys the specificity of
pronouncements.
Nick, I wholeheartedly agree about the potential abuses of methodological reductionism; however, I find your denigration of it to be rather harsh. Methodological reductionism has proven quite useful in the sciences and maths, and I might add has yielded irreducible components that in many ways definitively terminate the need for finite reduction. Take physics for example, in physics fundamental / irreducible particles have been posited and experimentally verified originally through the process of methodological reductionism. It was the endless reductionist search for these fundamental components by the likes of Newton and Fermi that led to the presumption of an ontologically discrete fundamental reality.
ReplyDeleteTrent: I'm not denying the progress that reductionism has gained for a certain understanding of science. Simply, in some fields it is inexcusable to rely on. Overall, I think there will need to be a point where we realize that this kind of reductionism has overstayed its welcome--what were once necessary simplifications will need to be re-evaluated as they become contextual oversimplifications.
Delete