It is useful to consider two kinds of
universals: abstract and concrete. First we will take a quick look at
the former, then a quick look at the latter, then a longer look at
various problems that arise therefrom.
An abstract universal is a universal
that excludes what is different about its species, and includes what
is similar. For example, “color” includes what is the same about
red and blue, but it does not contain
what is different about them. It is in this sense that we say we
“abstract away” this difference.
A
concrete universal is a universal that includes what is different
between its species rather than what is the same. The classic example
of a concrete universal is Hegel's Becoming, which contains both
Being and Not-Being within itself. In Hegel's philosophy, concrete
universals are what allow him to deduce his system of categories—you
can't deduce the color blue from the idea of color because what makes
blue itself and not red is explicitly excluded
from the idea of color because it is abstract.
Where
it gets more interesting (and relevant) is that Lukács
argued for a conception of the totality that was a concrete universal
in the manner of Hegel. The totality, as the complex of all social
relations (as they are becoming), is clearly a concept that does not
expressly exclude the individual moments in their particularity but
attempts to include them within itself. Further, as a totality,
the totality is a whole, meaning it has no other outside of itself.
This is where the problems come in.
Adorno
argued that the totality was not actually a concrete universal but
rather was abstract. (Actually, as far as I know he expressly argued
that Hegel's version was abstract, but the same applies to Lukács
as well.) The point for Adorno was that the totality had no other,
and hence was simple self-identity, empty and undefined because of
it's lack of oppostion.
Is
Adorno correct? Does the concept of the totality have meaning or is
it simply a vacuous mystification? This is obviously a very important
question for theoretical Marxism. While I'm not entirely up-to-date
on the literature, I can attempt to venture an answer.
The
totality is not a mental construction in the same way that Hegel's
Absolute Spirit was. The totality, properly conceived, is simply the
largest complex of processes thinkable. Tension and opposition
continue to exist inside the concept, unlike in the reconciliation of
Hegel. The antagonisms of constituent parts or processes are not done
away with at higher levels. Note that the same might be attributed to
Hegel, although in that case I would say that it is not true; the
Marxist totality is a concept (hopefully) functioning as a model of
all the myriad tensions of society. It is not just a philosophical
model, but also a sociological and economic one. In other words, the
meaning of the totality is not lost as tensions are subsumed within
it.
It
might be objected here that I am hypostatizing the totality. However,
a dogmatically-posited totality is different from a totality that is
constantly checked against material conditions, against reality, and
constantly re-abstracted and adjusted based on changing conditions.
Not for nothing have Marxists historically insisted on “science”,
in the sense of being interested in reality. The findings of
psychology, sociology, economics, etc. must be scrutinized and
analyzed, pieced together into a totality which can then be utilized
as a category of mediation for the further analysis of social
phenomena.
The
totality is real. The fact that we cannot positively picture it is
problematic, to be sure, but guesswork and approximations don't
magically lose their relevance. Something really existing must be
checked, concept against object, to get a legitimate understanding of
it. That attempt is an optimism Adorno did not have, and possibly for
historical reasons (Auschwitz, WWII, etc.).
